Cameron was forced to defend himself against growing criticism of his apparent product placement habit yesterday.

Several commentators have noticed that Camp Cameron seem addicted to pushing certain companies who either contribute to Tory funds, or are clients of Cameron's quarter million pound per annum spinmeister, Steve Hilton.

According to Matthew Tempest, writing in the Guardian the old-Etonian protested that "I try to be very careful in these matters but I talk about corporate social responsibility; I think it's important. I mention dozens of companies and I try to be careful of the ones that I mention."

But questions continue to be raised about his trip to India, said to be organised to open a new factory owned by a family of Tory donors.

Elsewhere Cameron's statement of values "Built to Last" has proved anything but. It has been withdrawn for urgent repair.

The Indeependent quotes one party member as writing in his response that

"Opportunity after opportunity has been there for attack on the policies of this dreadful Government but Cameron is silent. We are being too silent, too nice to those in power and seemingly afraid to show our arm."

The ostensible reason for Cameron´s press conference was to talk about his views on terrorism and the middle east.

The Millenium Elephant can´t be bettered on this:

"Look, just because I've got nothing new to say," says Dave, "don't think that I won't use the tired old cliché that the government should be doing MORE to stop the bogeyman."

"

Your copy of the FT this morning contained a good article by Samuel Brittan.

Sadly not much of is up for public viewing on the FT website (just this).

So before I lose my copy, here's the gist of it.

Brittan reviews two books: The British Moment paradoxically written in support of the "Scoop" Jackson society (Brittan says that Palmerston would be a better model for the authors of such a book); and What´s wrong with Liberal Interventionism by Roger Howard. The first is dangerous, the second disappointing.

Brittan has characterises scepticism for the Liberal Interventionist argument in the figure of Cobden - and we have been in this area before on the Apollo Project. (My view was that Palmerston was more of a nationalist than an interventionist.)

Brittan pinpoints one of the problems with liberal interventionism when he writes that "the results of well-intended intervention are often to increase the amount of suffering and misery in the world". He might add that it inevitably creates martyrs to feed fresh conflicts.

His final paragraph is worth reproduction in full:

In a speech in 1999, Tony Blair stated five criteria for human rights intervention. They included adequate preparation for the long term in the countries concerned and confining ourselves to "to sensible and prudent" military operations. What is wrong is not the the criteria but the ease with which the UK prime minister believes they are met. A Cobdenite would examine each case with intense suspicion and often come down on the side of, at most, indirect pressure.

It is good to see Ming Campbell standing up to the US over extradition.

At present the UK is obliged to extradite UK citizens to the US virtually on demand under the 2003 Extradition Act, passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the US.

But the US Senate (worried that Irish Republican suspects might be caught by it) has not ratified the Treaty. This is how Ming is reported on the BBC.

Sir Menzies said the arrangements were not reciprocal and were a "piece of ineptitude" by the UK Government.

"We have this extraordinary situation in which we essentially have a unilateral treaty," he said.

"Both countries signed this treaty, Britain has ratified it, we've changed our domestic legislation so that it conforms to the treaty.

"But in the United States, the Senate, largely under the influence of the Irish lobby which is determined to prevent any question of suspected IRA terrorists being extradited back to the United Kingdom, simply refuses to sign."

Sir Menzies said ministers could pass a new law to suspend the extradition obligations until the US Senate ratified the treaty.

The Sunday Times has a good explanation of the background (link below)

Link to Sunday Times article on the 2003 Extradition Act

In news that is likely to raise the ire of the Daily Mail, a judge has ruled that Control Orders are illegal, citing incompatibility with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (click here for Article 5).

I haven't read the judge's decision yet, and nor am I a legal scholar of any kind, but it seems self-evident that Control Orders violate one or both of these clauses:

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

Control Orders are orders issued by the Home Secretary for the indefinite detention without trial of those people that the Home Secretary regards as potential security threats.

Doubtless this case will provoke further tabloid outcry, and much of it will focus on the 'foreign' nature of the ECHR and its 'interference' with traditional British law, as though these rights were invented by meddlesome Europeans in order to change the course of British legal tradition.

This is utter nonsense. The ECHR is a document steeped in British traditions of liberty, rights to fair trial and many more things besides. Without wishing to sound excessively nationalistic, it could be said that the document has far more of a British character than a European one; it could also be said that it embodies legal traditions that go back longer in Britain than they do in the rest of Europe.

How long? How about nearly 800 years? Compare, if you will, the above quotation from the ECHR with this, from Magna Carta:

[29] No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.

In this, it is the government which stands against centuries of English and British legal tradition, and the ECHR which firmly defends the best of those traditions. Next time the Daily Mail, David Cameron or Tony Blair himself try to say otherwise, they will be lying through their teeth. There is nothing more foreign to British traditions of liberty than the idea that a politician should be able to detain or imprison 'enemies of the state' without presenting any evidence for doing so and without any right for the detainee to challenge their status. That is a concept which belongs in an authoritarian state, not in a liberal democracy.

‘Issues that once divided Conservatives from Liberal Democrats are now issues where we both agree. Our attitude to devolution and localisation of power. Iraq. The environment. I'm a liberal Conservative.’

At the time, the Lib Dems were leaderless and Cameron was fishing for defectors. The Lib Dem poll ratings were plummeting and Cameron sensed an opportunity. Then the Dunfermline result was announced, a new leader was elected and now a new policy programme is taking shape. The Lib Dems are polling over 20% again, and suddenly the idea of attracting Lib Dem votes looks less attractive to Cameron. So he decides that he does disagree with the Lib Dems over the war in Iraq after all, and supports Tony Blair's decision to go to war. The BBC reports:

Conservative leader David Cameron has said he still believes going to war with Iraq was the right thing to do.

In an interview for BBC's Friday Night with Jonathan Ross, he said the war had been "very unpopular" and some bad decisions had been made since it began.

But Mr Cameron said "those of us who supported" the military action should "see it through".

He praised Tony Blair's reform of the Labour party but said he wanted the Tories to be "the party of the future".

On the issue of Iraq, he told Ross he supported Mr Blair's decision to go to war.

Just what does Cameron really think? It seems to me that, whatever his true opinion, he is working hard to conceal it. First he was for the Iraq war, then he was against it, now he's for it again. Will he oppose it the next time a major bomb goes off, rediscover his support for it when things start to improve, then, when the troops eventually do come home, pretend he was in favour of the whole thing all along? It would certainly fit the pattern.

Personally, I'm glad to see that he's dropping the 'liberal Conservative' line. It leaves the real liberals to get on with the job, without his posing getting in the way.

There has been much written on the subject of Iraq, which I will not repeat here (though I will recommend a recent guest blog piece on the subject). What worries me most now is the larger geopolitical situation; that, far from making us all safer, the Iraq war and the mishandling of its aftermath has left us all in greater danger, facing larger problems on the international stage.

Yesterday's piece in the Washington Post (found via QandO - their take is well worth reading) reported on a document which reveals the scale of strategic blundering in the US global strategy. It begins:

Just after the lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three years ago, an unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at the Near East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from Iran for a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax suggested everything was on the table -- including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.

But top Bush administration officials, convinced the Iranian government was on the verge of collapse, belittled the initiative. Instead, they formally complained to the Swiss ambassador who had sent the fax with a cover letter certifying it as a genuine proposal supported by key power centers in Iran, former administration officials said.

Read that again: 'full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups'. And, in their infinite overconfidence, the Bush administration turned that deal down. I am genuinely unable to understand why; those terms are better than the ones being sought, with great difficult, by the current US negotiating team. This is what puzzles me: did Bush expect to get a better deal? We all know that Middle East intelligence has been flawed, but were the US administration so deluded as to believe that the Iranian government was on the verge of collapse?

In refusing the offer, they broke a cardinal rule of negotiation: always bargain from a position of strength. At their strongest point, having toppled Saddam in a matter of days, the US should have been able to agree a very favourable settlment with Iran. Instead, they rejected the Iranian offer and thus gave the Iranians time to regroup and plan. In that meantime, Iran elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a man whose political career largely depends on his defiance of the US. A deal would have strengthened the moderate factions in Iran, it would have shown that peaceful negotiation provided a way forward. By rejecting a good offer, the US signalled that peaceful negotiation achieves nothing.

I take no pleasure in the irony that, were such a deal offered today, it would be trumpeted as a gigantic success. Regrettably, the idea now seems to be beyond the bounds of possibility; we're unlike to see another such offer for perhaps a generation. When historians come to consider this, they will probably wonder, just as I do: what was Bush thinking?

I originally blogged on the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when the news first broke and details were scarce. Now, more information about the implications of his death have come to light.

The BBC is reporting comments from the Iraqi national security adviser, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, that the death of Zarqawi marks the "beginning of the end" for his organisation, Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This judgement appears to be based on the recovery of important documents from the scene of Zarqawi's death:

Mr Rubaie said a pocket hard drive, a laptop and documents were found in the debris after the strike.

The documents and records revealed the names and whereabouts of other al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders, he said, adding that more information has since been found in raids on other insurgent hideouts.

Associated Press is reporting that a total of 452 raids have been carried out since Zarqawi's death, the majority being joint coalition-Iraqi operations and a substantial number being carried out by Iraqi forces alone. These raids have apparently led to the deaths of over 100 insurgents and the capture of 28 arms caches.

So is this the big breakthrough? We can, of course, but hope. But what I do find heartening for the future security of Iraq is the increasingly prominent role taken by Iraqi forces and the Iraqi government. This quote from Mr Rubaie illustrates the point:

"We believe that this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq," Mr Rubaie said.

"They did not anticipate how powerful the Iraqi security forces are and how the government is on the attack now."

I'm wary of drawing conclusions from a short run of apparently good news, against a background of a multitude of disappointments. But if this does prove to be the turning point, it will be due to the fact that the Iraqi government is taking the lead in providing for the country's security.

It's also interesting to note that documents found with Zarqawi listed possible future strategies for Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and one was to widen the gulf between the US and Iran by carrying out attacks which could be blamed directly on Iran. We should be glad that this plan has failed, and bear its implications in mind when considering who bears responsibility for future terrorist attacks.

The best reason to be pleased about Ming Campbell's proposed visit to Guatanamo Bay is that Guantanamo is a disgrace. A disgrace not just to the USA, but to the West as a whole. It is good to see Ming speaking up on this issue.

The next reason is that it responds to Simon Isledon's call for Liberal Democrats to make more use of symbolism. Ming is not just speaking up - he is confronting the issue in person.

And finally, in making this stand, Ming is forging a link with one of the most powerful moments in Liberal history - Campbell Bannerman's condemnation of concentration camps in South Africa. The proposals on tax and this staunch opposition to barbarism in Guantanamo point to a Liberal renewal. Slowly, piece by painful piece, we are clearing the ground for a British renewal too: a move to a more homest, more inclusive, more democratic politcs.

It seems to be true this time - Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, is dead.

I hope this helps to prove the futility of violence. Zarqawi's bombs, guns and propaganda have cast a shadow over parts of Iraq for much of the last three years. But, as the old adage goes, those who live by the sword also die by the sword. Whilst those who opted for the peaceful, democratic route are forming their government, Zarqawi lies dead, and I think most Iraqis will be glad. He was never one of them; he was a foreign terrorist who chose Iraq as a place to commit murder.

There is not much more to be said. For the sake of the Iraqis, we can only hope that this represents a turning point.

Normally in these situations, I'd hold off from commenting until all of the relevant facts are in. There's an investigation underway, as occurs with all police shootings, and there is no clear and definitive account of what happened.

But so far, based on the BBC report, it appears possible to conclude that:

1) Police were acting on a tip-off of some kind

2) They expected, or hoped, to find evidence confirming the tip-off

3) They don't appear to have found it yet

4) In the course of the search, one of the inhabitants of the house, Mohammed Abdul Kahar, was shot. He, along with his brother, was arrested under anti-terror legislation.

5) The police are not accepting responsibility for the shooting, with the suggestion being made that one of the brothers shot the other during a scuffle

I'm wholly in favour of the police vigorously pursuing terrorists. People plotting murder should be apprehended and tough police action is going to be required to do it. I just wish I felt that I could trust the police to do it properly and honestly.

Today's news reports bring with them a horrible sense of deja vu; as with the De Menezes shooting, we have numerous versions of events floating around which are obviously contradictory. The sole official police statement merely states that a man was shot, but not who pulled the trigger. According to the BBC, quoting the News of the World, "a Whitehall source" says that the man was accidentally shot by his brother. The police have neither confirmed nor denied this story, something which cannot fail to stir memories of the rumours around the De Menezes shooting; the heavy coat, the jumping of the turnstiles and the suggestion that he was a suspect in an ongoing investigation. All of these were rumours which originated from within the police or government and were not denied. They all later proved to be untrue.

So what is going on?

Lawyers for both of the arrested men deny the story that the younger brother was the one who fired the shot. This places them at odds with the "Whitehall source", although the police have not officially taken a line on this.

As I see it, there are only two possibilities: either he was shot by a police officer, or he was shot by someone else. Ballistics evidence should be categorical, once the evidence is examined it will prove one case or the other.

This leaves us in a confusing situation. If the police shot Mr Kahar, then why is a "Whitehall source" claiming otherwise? And why are the police not clarifying the situation? On the other hand, if Mr Kahar was shot by his younger brother, why have the police not mentioned this fact and why has it only come to light, two days after the event, via an unnamed source?

The police have learned nothing from their handling of the De Menezes affair. Public confidence requires that the police be honest in their actions. We may, perhaps, expect off-the-record briefings from inside sources in the world of politics, but the job of the police is to behave unimpeachably in upholding the law. The more confusion they allow, the greater the loss of confidence. If they prove to have behaved correctly in their execution of the raid, then they are allowing this to be undermined by briefings to the press. If they have made a terrible mistake, then their failure to admit it will undermine their authority even more.